Semiotic Machines - an Introduction
The limits of pragmatics á la Morris 1938
AUTHOR: Dr. Gerd Döben-Henisch
FIRST DATE: Aug-6, 1996
DATE of LAST CHANGE: Sept-29, 1996
With the above outline we have only a first impression how the concept of (pure) pragmatics of Morris 1938 could fit into the S(N)R-paradigm and into the Minimal Theoretical Framework.
A more detailed examination of this concepts reveals, however, several limits of this approach, which can become highly problematic if used for real semiotic work.
The structure representing the part of pure semiotic contains lots of terms suggesting different internal states and processes of the interpreter. In the realm of pure semiotic this is allowed; the only limits of pure semiotic are the syntactical rules.
But if one wants to connect pure semiotic with sets of data, then the formal structures should fulfil at least the following postulates:
(i) The object-tupel of the structure should provide the types for all concrete objects stated in the data.
(ii) All main object-types of the structure should have at least one instance in the data.
(ii) The axioms of the structure should be consistent with the data-statements.
The critical postulate is postulate (ii). It allows theoretical terms as relations and functions, but not as main objects.
If one would try to relate the pure pragmatics of Morris 1938 with empirical data, the postulate (ii) would raise a conflict. In pure semiotics Morris is assuming that there are such kinds of entities like designata as abstract objects, but in his concept of measurment he is excluding such kinds of entities. This is a consequence of his acceptance of the behavioristic paradigm which demands the exclusion of any kind of private experience. This poses a methodological problem: how will Morris rectify his terms in the pure theory like 'taking-account-of', 'interpret', 'confirm', 'prepare' and the like if he does not accept the experience of internal states as possible data?
To overcome the methodological problem one strategy could perhaps be to take into account the physiological, especially the neuro-physiological states trying to reformulate subjective experiences with physiological terms. This strategy is today very common, even some philosophers have taken this attitude under the label of 'naturalizing the mind' (see for instance the recent book of Thomas METZINGER (1995) and the reader about Bewuátsein (1996) edited by him).
The succes of this SNR-strategy depends on the assumption, that everything which is relevant for the conscious behavior of human sign users can be reconstructed by this account.
Theo Herrmann, one of the leading german psychologist of language is sceptical about the possibility to reconstruct the language-relevant internal subjective states of a sign-user only by an SNR-strategy (cf. Herrmann 1985:10, 12). He assumes, that a sign-user is able to model internally the 'intentions' and 'expectations' of the other participants in a discours and that a sign user can 'internalize' conventions and social institutions including the possible consequences for his own behavior (cf. Herrmann 1985:12f, 31f, 33, 34). And if so, if we will not be able to reconstruct central internal states and processes by physiological terms, then it becomes highly questionable according to Herrmann whether the denotata of theoretical terms are describing one and the same process (cf. Herrmann 1985:107).
There is one main argument why a pure SNR-strategy will not work in the case of semiotic: petitio principii. This argument runs as follows: physiological research -including brain research- deals in the case of information processes in the body primarily with energy-pattern distributed in neuronal cells and cell-assemblies. To state that the energy-patterns of certain cell-assemblies have a certain relationship to certain private experiences presupposes, that these private experiences are somehow available as data. If these private experiences would be available and after having established a mapping between these different data-sets, then one could speak -probably in a very complicated manner- about private experiences only in SNR-terms. Surely there are brain-researchers -for instance Gerhard Roth (1995) and Helmut Schwegler (1992, 1995) in Bremen- who think that they can establish such a mapping without having the data. From a philosophical point of view it is hard to see how this should work.
There are two immediate consequences from this last result: (i) the physiologically enriched behavioral paradigm still has clear limits with regard to the possible data and the possible explaining structures based on these data; (ii) the question regarding the status of private experiences in the context of semiosis remains open.
At this point one should remember the fact that Morris did not exclude private experience on account of semiotic but only on account of his personal preference to apply the behavioristic approach in the context of semiotic. He states explicitly, that it would not be necessary to deny private experiences from the point of view of semiosis (cf. Morris 1971: 21).
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