Semiotic Machines - an Introduction
From inside the brain
AUTHOR: Dr. Gerd Döben-Henisch
FIRST DATE: Aug-6, 1996
DATE of LAST CHANGE: Sept-29, 1996
What can we say about private experiences ?
Staying for a moment in the realm of empirical sciences we know today already that those signals C_n, which in our brain highly probable represent the objects of experience are totally different from those objects X, which we postulate as the possible sources of our (sensory) experiences.
Between the suggested sources of our empirical experience X and the neuronal energy pattern we find the interbody-medium transferring some energy S from causing objects X to a sens-organ triggering sens-perception S'; then we find the body itself with his sense-organs, his neuronal cells interacting one with another where the mapping between the sense-perception S' and the processed neuronal signals C_n is normally not one-to-one.
Although we can not say to much at the moment about the relationship between processed neuronal data C_n and the so-called conscious experiences C_c one can state very clearly, that the 'knowing brain' deals in no case with the objects 'as such' (= X) but only with the sense-perceptions S' and the processed sensory data C_n which include information which the brain itself has produced.
From this it follows that the point of view of a 'conscious view' of the world has to be centered in that part of the brain which represents the processed data (= C_n and/ or C_c). And because we have already seen that an interpretation of the neurological data by conscious data -and vice versa- can only be done with presupposition that both sets of data are given, we have to claim, that we have to find ways how we can reconstruct the conscious data in a sound way.
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