The phenomenological point of view

This is a working paper which will probably be rewritten several times in the next months
AUTHOR: Dr. Gerd Döben-Henisch
FIRST DATE: February 19, 1996
DATE of LAST CHANGE: February 28, 1996
(For an overview about the meaning of the term `phenomenological' see e.g. E.STRÖKER/ P.JANSSEN [1989]. Additionally I have consulted E.HUSSERL [1913], E.MACH [1922], M.HEIDEGGER [1927], J-P.SARTRE [1943], M.MERLEAU-PONTY [1945], and HOCHE [1973])

To take a phenomenological point of view does not explain anything; it merely declares what is your basic attitude with regard to reality.

In a phenomenological point of view you accepts what you 'perceive' as a primary epistemic fact. That, 'what you know of' as a 'given' is your primary reality. You can not go 'beyond' these facts. Every given, whatever it can be with regard to distinguishable details, is called a phenomenon.

If you want to 'analyze' the set of all phenomena you are confronted with at least two problems:
  • That what is primarily given are not only sensory data in the common sense; a primary fact is also that you can distinguish drives, emotions, that you have memories, that you can distinguish changes, that you have different phenomena at the same time, and the like; i.e. the primary given is a very heterogeneous 'material'.

  • If you want to communicate your individual experience with some other person you have to use a language, at least to be able to 'name' the different phenomena; but naming clearly will surely not be enough. You will need more complex syntactical patterns. But the usage of the language presupposes a complex network of fairly interwoven relationships between sounds, syntactical structures, possible givens, complex communicative roles, and probably much more.


The task of a phenomenological analysis is therefor a big one, probably an unsolvable one, but there is no alternative. To neglect this task would mean to neglect the epistemic conditions under which we have to recognize ourselves and the world we are living in.

In what follows we call the set of all phenomena D-PHEN. And with regard to D-PHEN we will establish those disciplines which are necessary for KIP II.

To continue with the introduction see: Constructing a theory

To continue with a phenomenological analysis of the consciousness see: Phänomenologische Analyse des Bewußtseins (March-9, 96)

Comments are welcomed to kip-ml@inm.de
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